


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
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
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[South Vietnam: The Communists have resumed military pressure against the Thuong Duc complex southwest of Da Nang.

A heavy probe against a US Marine night position near Thuong Duc was followed by a series of sharp encounters lasting nearly 12 hours. The fighting cost the Communists 75 killed.

The Thuong Duc action is the only current major enemy offensive effort in South Vietnam. Elsewhere during the weekend, ground action was light. Widely scattered allied-initiated skirmishes were reported and enemy gunners fired mortars at two provincial capitals in the Mekong Delta. [redacted]

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Czechoslovakia-USSR: Party leader Dubcek has for the first time publicly acquiesced in just about all Soviet demands, and has announced his intention to set Czechoslovakia back on the road to orthodoxy.

In an emotional speech on 11 October, Dubcek said no opposition to Moscow would be allowed in the country, and that his policies would be guided by the principles of Communist party supremacy and of alliance with the USSR. All that remained of the hopes he had previously held out was his guarantee of the personal safety of law-abiding citizens. He conceded his regime's failure to appreciate Soviet views.

Dubcek's remarks may deepen divisions within the leadership on compliance with Moscow's edicts. He implicitly blamed several of his colleagues for bringing about the invasion by being "too slow" in taking effective countermeasures against incipient "antisocialist" elements. Dubcek made clear that because of Soviet demands people who dragged their feet in the past had one last chance to fall into line, and that he expects compliance with the demands of the "new reality" from party and government officials as well as from the people.

Dubcek set out severe guidelines for the public media. He stressed that censorship must be combined with dissemination of "positive views." He explicitly warned that further polemics with Moscow and its allies, "even in the face of slander," would serve no purpose.

Dubcek made it clear that while he would not resign voluntarily, Soviet dictates will be implemented with or without him. In giving this stark choice, he indicated he would stay because he had the trust of the people and implied that any Soviet-implanted successor might be much worse.

(continued)

He was probably motivated to speak as a result of an incident on 9 October, when a rally of pro-Moscow Communists in a Prague factory adopted a resolution condemning the "weakness and incompetence" of the Dubcek regime. The rally took place in the approving presence of four high-ranking Soviet military officers, at least one of whom joined in urging the adoption of the resolution.

Subsequent wide Soviet domestic publicity for the meeting suggests that Moscow feels it has found and is ready to exploit the nucleus of an indigenous Czechoslovak opposition to Dubcek. Moscow's announcement on 12 October that it will publish a Czech and Slovak language newspaper in Prague indicates that it is intent on giving its supporters there a guaranteed forum.

Both Dubcek and the Russians may be uneasy, however, about signs of unwillingness by the great majority of the people to accept the heavy Soviet hand. Numerous worker petitions are circulating, demanding complete withdrawal of Soviet troops. Dubcek admitted the course he was taking was harsh and unpopular, and he warned that continued pamphleteering against the USSR presence in the country would not be tolerated.

Dubcek's speech probably will clear the way for the conclusion of a Czechoslovak-Soviet status of forces agreement. The head of the Czechoslovak delegation which has been negotiating the agreement in Moscow reportedly returned to Prague on 11 October, while the rest of his delegation stayed behind working on details. A central committee plenum will probably follow the signing of the agreement, which may sanction the indefinite stationing of about 100,000 Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. So far, however, there have been no changes in the status of the occupying forces. [redacted]

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Poland: Party leader Gomulka's agitated and stumbling speech on 8 October may have left the party rank and file wondering if he is still up to the task of running the country.

Judging from excerpts shown on Warsaw television, the 63-year-old Gomulka apparently wandered from his text a number of times to give rambling answers to unexpected criticism and to speak imprecisely about other matters troubling him, including the situation in Czechoslovakia and unsatisfactory domestic economic progress. His party audience was tolerantly bored. These impressions came through clearly, even though Gomulka's words were heavily edited before being made public.

Gomulka spoke to the provincial party organization in Silesia, led by one of his factional rivals, politburo member Edward Gierek, and normally he would have been well prepared in such a situation. The party leader's bewildered performance may have been partially caused by the surprisingly frank discussion which he encountered there. The subsequent telecast of excerpts of the speech could have been a deliberate attempt to damage Gomulka's image by his other major rival, hard-line party secretary Mieczyslaw Moczar. Moczar's faction controls most of the public media.

In the past six months, Gomulka has weathered the factional challenge, but only at the cost of major compromise with his rivals. His poor performance in Silesia may shake the confidence of his followers in the party that he can maintain his position without further concessions at the party congress on 11 November. [redacted]

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Brazil: The government has succeeded in disbanding the congress of the illegal National Student Union.

On 11 October police broke up the congress and arrested nearly one thousand students, including the Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo regional leaders, Vladimir Palmeira and Jose Dirceu. Some extreme leftist students are barricaded in the University of Sao Paulo, however, and trouble could develop if police try to force them out. If charges can be made to stick against the arrested leaders, student antigovernment activities will be severely handicapped.

* * * *

The government still has no definite information on the murderers of the US Army officer who was shot to death in Sao Paulo on 12 October. Leaflets left near the body denounced US involvement in Vietnam and in the death of Che Guevara in Bolivia last year. This incident is the latest in a long line of terrorist acts in Sao Paulo which police have been unable to control. [redacted]

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Southern Africa: The white-ruled countries of southern Africa are moving toward closer though limited collaboration in matters of security and economics, while at the same time expanding their influence in neighboring black-ruled states.

Contacts among the white-run security forces in southern Africa have grown apace with the continuing infiltration of foreign-trained guerrillas. Over 200 South African police have been stationed in Rhodesia for the past year, although Rhodesia has chosen to use them sparingly.

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Even some of the black-led nations, more concerned about their own internal interests than with the liberation movements, maintain liaison with the better prepared security forces of their white neighbors. Portuguese collaboration with the Malawians is illustrated by Lisbon's recent gift of a patrol boat to assist Malawi security forces on Lake Malawi. The South Africans have easy access to key police officials in the former High Commission Territories, and the operating costs of the Lesotho police are largely borne by a \$700,000 grant from South Africa.

Economic relations among Southern Africans are also expanding. South Africa and Mozambique continue to play a crucial role in helping Rhodesia evade the effects of international sanctions, and in the process have increased intra-regional trade. Through investments in development projects South Africa has expanded its economic ties with its neighbors, both black and white, and may be on the verge of extending a \$28 to 56 million loan to bolster the Rhodesian economy.

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South Africa's economic and military strength is viewed by neighboring countries as a threat as well as an asset, however. Neither the Rhodesians nor the Portuguese are comfortable with South Africa's apartheid policies, and, along with the smaller, black-ruled states, they are wary of becoming economically subservient to Pretoria.

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
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Locust Situation in the Horn of Africa



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Africa: The locust threat along the western Ethiopian escarpment has been somewhat alleviated, but swarms may now be moving toward previously unaffected areas.

A change in wind direction and effective spraying operations are driving the locusts, which have damaged crops around Keren in northern Ethiopia, into the western lowlands bordering the Sudan. Other swarms in northern Somali Republic are expected to move south into the Ogaden area of Ethiopia where heavy rains are creating excellent breeding conditions.

The Kenyan Government, fearing that the locusts in Ethiopia will continue southward, is preparing for an invasion. Several Kenyan pilots have returned from Asmara, where they underwent antilocust training in the Ethiopian campaign, and the government is preparing 20 airstrips in northern Kenya to accommodate spraying aircraft. A locust warning has also been issued in Uganda. [redacted]

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[Panama: Shooting occurred last night in Panama City following the formal installation of the provisional junta and cabinet, and new clashes between Arias forces and the national guard may erupt today.

Arias yesterday issued a highly inflammatory statement, which may have been broadcast clandestinely, for his followers to take up arms against the guard. In addition, leaflets were circulating urging people to go into the streets. Some reports indicate that Arias supporters hope to organize disturbances or a general strike today. Communist elements probably would join in any violent action, but they are remaining aloof for the time being until other forces take the initiative. In the past, efforts by Arias to foment a general strike have failed.

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[] guardsmen moved quickly over the weekend to round up potential troublemakers. Patrols entered the university and confiscated materials for molotov cocktails. Junta forces can be expected to take harsh action against student militants who try to precipitate disorders.

Efforts by the military leaders to seek the cooperation of as many parties as possible have continued, as they attempt to cloak their take-over with a semblance of broadly based popular support. Most members of Arias' National Union coalition, however, are reluctant to desert the ousted president until it appears clear that he will not return to power.

If the provisional military junta manages to make its authority stick, as now seems probable, Arias' partners probably will switch their support to gain some voice in the new government. []

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